Does It Matter to Elites Where Foreign Aid Comes From? Experimental Test

• In Event: The Political Economy of Aid from the Recipient Perspective

Abstract

This study aims to understand whether members of parliament in developing countries show different levels of support toward aid projects funded by democratic versus autocratic donors. This article argues that elites’ support toward foreign aid projects differ whether they are part of the incumbent or the opposition camp. Elites may consider the extent that aid projects from autocratic and democratic actors, can increase or decrease their chances of political survival, benefit their domestic audiences, and risk changing the level of playing field between the incumbent and opposition parties. This paper suggests that the political regime of the foreign donor may additionally determine leaders’ support for political conditionality and transparency mechanisms. This analysis contributes to the existing research by shedding light and testing key mechanisms related to politicians’ incentives to cooperate with foreign donors who are democratic vs. autocratic. Previous research does not differentiate between elites’ incentives depending on their party position and how this impacts politicians’ incentives to cooperate with various donors. To test these hypotheses, I experiment with vignettes, among members of parliament in Kosovo, a post-conflict and post-communist country that receives large amounts of financial assistance from both democratic and autocratic donors.

Author

• Adea Gafuri, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs