When Do Voters Reward Politicians for Foreign Aid? Experimental Evidence from Malawi

• In Event: The Political Economy of Aid from the Recipient Perspective

Abstract

In these two chapters, which form part of a larger book project, I examine the impacts of foreign aid on voting behavior and electoral accountability. Most pre-existing scholarship argues that aid will tend to entrench incumbents and harm electoral accountability. Evidence for such claims, however, has been mixed. I develop a model of retrospective accountability to illustrate how foreign aid can be a double-edged sword, often harming rather than helping incumbents in elections. I also show how foreign aid can often improve (rather than harm) electoral accountability by empowering voters with information to sanction poorly performing incumbents.

To test the theory, I conducted in-person surveys with 2,331 citizens around a sample of 180 schools in Malawi before and after the delivery of a foreign aid project. Additionally, I conducted a SMS information experiment which varied voter knowledge about the origin of the foreign aid project. Voters who live in an area that received aid were more likely to anticipate voting for incumbent councillors. Further, I show that aid increased the number of visits by incumbents and I provide anecdotal evidence of more credit claiming activity by politicians. The results of the SMS experiment, however, show a sizable backlash against incumbents among those who failed to benefit from aid. These findings contradict core predictions of the aid curse argument and imply a more nuanced view of how aid affects elections and democratization.

Author

• Ryan Steele Jablonski, London School of Economics and Political Science