The Economic Aspect of Democratic Republicanism in Early American Theory

• In Event: Poster Session: American Politics Research & Ideas and Institutions in American Political Thought
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Ideas and Institutions in American Political Thought

Abstract

The American Revolution and its political theory are traditionally portrayed as exclusively and narrowly political: from Hannah Arendt’s juxtaposition with the French Revolution to enduring narratives of a liberal consensus, the social and economic aspects of early republicanism are commonly assigned a negligible role. In adjacent disciplines, this limitation has long been overcome by historical research establishing the importance of those aspects to political conflict at the time. This paper is an attempt to reconstruct that strain of political thought emerging through war and internal struggles. From older notions of moral economy and “Agrarian Law” to ambivalent theoretical innovations and the changing political consciousness of non-elites, creating egalitarian economic structures became part of a political project fundamentally opposed to Federalist theory and practice. At the same time, this fledgling ideology remained limited by internal contradiction, its preoccupation with particular political grievances, and the tendency to identify (coercive) power exclusively with government.

Although historians have long documented the components of a democratic republicanism distinct to the American revolution, its implications for political theory remain underexplored. This paper first provides an overview of its politico-economic aspect through six topics: (1) the legacy of “feudal” notions of social justice throughout the colonial era; (2) ambivalent interpretations of economic liberalization as paths toward political freedom; that is, the openness of the rising tide of free trade theories to radically different conclusions; (3) the fuzzy line separating what are now considered the distinct traditions of “classical economists” and (late) mercantilism; (4) the relationship between property and citizenship, which proved adaptable to both aristocratic and democratic proposals; (5) the relationship between nascent industrial capitalism and slavery within and between the states; and (6) the elevated role of non-elites in securing political independence and its long-term and largely unintended effects on their self-understanding as political actors.

On this basis, I suggest that two primary concepts can help us understand both the democratic promise of the revolutionary period and its recurring defeats: “monopoly” and “independence”. The idea of monopoly as the primary threat to freedom, applied primarily to absolute monarchy: in the lived experience of the colonists, the appeal of breaking the monopoly of royal charters and similar closed systems relying on bribery and/or personal connection became a particularly effective argument and explains both the violent political action against privileged elites and the proto-libertarian skepticism toward the state’s role in economic relations (and beyond). Closely related, the idea of independence brought together the methodological individualism of social contract theory with republican demands for equality, resulting in a generalized and internalized aversion to party, faction, and collectivity.

I then illustrate the importance of these concepts with two examples: resistance to taxation and sanctity of private land ownership. In both cases, the discrepancy between historical context and current manifestation discloses the democratic potential of the revolutionary era as well as its weaknesses. At the time, these policy positions were endorsed primarily by the lower classes as a defense against more powerful groups using state power and a regressive tax system in order to ensure continued dominance. In today’s context, by contrast, reference to such features of the American political tradition can be found almost exclusively on the political right, from Tea Party activists to anarcho-capitalists and self-appointed patriots. In both cases, relying on “independence” and resisting government “monopoly” has remained identical in letter while losing much of its original spirit and impetus.

I conclude on a number of suggestions concerning the legacy of American republicanism. On the one hand, democratic and emancipatory thought reached a high point in those years to which it would not soon return, with demands ranging from the immediate abolition of slavery and land redistribution to universal suffrage and democratically controlled institutions; demands of which many continue to be aspirational rather than fulfilled. On the other hand, any attempt of rejuvenating democracy will have to be informed by democratic republicanism’s political failures and conceptual weaknesses, both internal and due to historical change: where “independence”, is impossible, the recovery of emancipatory thought needs to be accompanied by forms of interdependence; and the distrust of coercive government powers especially in a highly unequal society needs to be balanced with the discomforting notion that such power may also be indispensable in solving contemporary social problems.

Author

• Volker Schmitz, Johns Hopkins University