Elite Purges and Consolidation of Power

• In Event: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Regime Transitions

Abstract

How and when do dictators promote the consolidation of power by eliminating rival elites? In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework that highlights the critical role of leader entry manner in shaping the trajectory of the power concentration and how leaders’ action toward elites systematically changes over time. My theory explains why initially-weak leaders are most likely to successfully promote the consolidation of power should they survive the critical period of the first few years, challenging the literature’s argument that weak leaders need most to credibly commit to sharing power with elites and thus would be least likely to concentrate power. Empirical results using novel data on military and civilian elite purges covering 102 authoritarian countries between 1980 and 2010 provide strong evidence for my hypotheses.

Author

• Jun Koga Sudduth, Indiana University, Bloomington