A Theory of Institutional and Coercive Power Sharing

• In Event: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Regime Transitions

Abstract

Autocrats frequently share power with the opposition to overcome their commitment problem. This paper presents a formal model that incorporates the two core elements of power-sharing arrangements: committing to deliver more spoils to the opposition, and reallocating coercive power toward the opposition. Equilibrium power sharing requires three conditions. First, the opposition poses a credible rebellion threat, as in existing models. Second, the ruler willingly shares power rather than triggers a revolt. This is not guaranteed because sharing power shifts power toward the opposition, which creates a commitment problem for the opposition. Third, the opposition willingly accepts a power-sharing deal rather than revolts. This depends on whether the coercive consequences of power sharing more greatly bolster the opposition’s offensive or defensive capabilities. Even if all three conditions are met, power sharing is still not guaranteed because of mixing. Modeling coercive consequences of power sharing yields these new insights.

Author

• Jack Paine, Emory University