Coopting the Cowed: How Closing Legislatures Limits the Costs of Power Sharing

• In Event: Legislatures and Legislators in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Why do autocrats close legislatures? What happens during those closures? A large body of research asks why autocrats conduct elections or open legislatures. We suggest that the opposite question is more interesting. Autocracies with legislatures and elections are the norm; closed legislatures are the anomalies. The question, in our minds, therefore is why legislatures are closed, particularly given all the benefits they are theorized to provide. In this paper, we interrogate why autocrats suspend elections and close legislatures. We theorize that legislatures are closed in order to consolidate power. We support our theory by confirming a series of empirical implications including the timing of legislative closures, the connection between closures and the promulgation of constitutions, the timing of military purges, and the number of parties in newly reopened legislatures. Our findings suggest that rather than eliminating a constraint, autocrats close these institutions to eliminate rivals and reopen them to project power.

Authors

• Ben Noble, University College London

• Paul J. Schuler, University of Arizona

• Jun Koga Sudduth, Indiana University, Bloomington