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In democracies and non-democracies alike, the share of content flagged as ‘fake’ on social media is on the rise. To date, many governments have passed online disinformation laws and institutionalised the labelling of ‘fake’ information. However, we know very little about these measures’ effect on online activity and offline public opinion. This research focuses on nondemocracies, and I propose that authoritarian incumbents flag social media posts as ‘fake’ in order to impede criticism of their activities and shape evaluations of targeted accounts as untrustworthy. By flagging content produced by independent news outlets and opposition groups as ‘fake’, the authorities also compromise targeted groups’ ability to generate and maintain mass support through signalling mechanisms. Mainly, ‘fake news’ labels communicate to audiences about the boundaries of online speech, and the uncertainty yields from labels may increase perceived risks for subsequent mobilisation. 'Fake news' labels also convey the incumbent's capacity for constructing and maintaining law and order in the digital sphere, indicating the difficulty of challenging the existing regime and hindering opposition alliance. I test my theoretical arguments with an original survey experiment from Singapore, where an electoral autocracy extensively employs strategies of disinformation labelling, and opposition parties compete for votes and public support against the ruling party (N=1500). My findings provide one of the first tests of the political effects of disinformation labelling. This work expands understanding of online repression’s consequences and audiences and has implications for studies of authoritarian politics.