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Speaking with the Enemy: Politician Media Choices and Voter Evaluations

Fri, September 6, 4:00 to 5:30pm, Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Franklin 6

Abstract

Some Democrats make appearances on Fox News, and some Republicans go on MSNBC. However, many refuse. This poses a puzzle. Why do certain politicians forfeit the chance to reach, and potentially, persuade millions of TV watchers on the other side of the aisle, especially when cable is a key source of how Americans learn about politics? We theorize that, even if news audiences are sharply splintered along party lines, crossover viewing is common, and voters who watch out-partisan outlets may punish politicians for ``speaking with the enemy.'' Thus, politicians decide which voters they want to court. Appearing on adversarial networks may appeal to some out-partisans, but alienate many in-partisans. We make two predictions:

1. Out-partisan voters (especially “soft partisans”) will judge politicians more FAVORABLY who appear on uncongenial media
2. In-partisan voters (especially “hard partisans”) will judge politicians more UNFAVORABLY who appear on uncongenial media.

To test our theory, we propose three preregistered, nationally-representative survey experiments in the U.S. that randomly manipulate images of well-known politicians shown on Fox News or MSNBC, as well as public statements made about the networks. Experiment 1 looks at “passive” exposure to partisan news, where voters may lack control over content consumption, by randomly assigning participants to different networks, including uncongenial media. Experiment 2 endogenizes the choices of voters to watch their preferred media outlet by simulating how viewers “actively” browse cable channels. Finally, experiment 3 looks at reactions to “grandstanding,” or public statements by politicians regarding out-partisan media appearances, and to reports of participation in out-partisan media.

Our study will add to research on media and partisan polarization by endogenizing the choice of politicians to interface with diverse constituencies.

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