The Balance of Nuclear Humility: Techno-Optimism, Complexity and Nuclear Primacy

• In Event: Nuclear Weapons Posture and Proliferation in Asia

Abstract

Should the US accept mutual vulnerability with China? After decades of technological advancement, the US possesses the world’s most accurate long-range strategic missiles. To highlight this advantage, a new generation of analysts has used standard nuclear targeting calculations to argue that modern capabilities could provide the US with a reliable first-strike capability against hardened ICBM silos. In this “new era of counterforce,” optimists suggest that the US may outcompete its rivals and shield itself from nuclear deterrence. Yet the complex technological challenges of hard-target counterforce go beyond mere accuracy, and the standard calculations overlook significant gaps in our knowledge about nuclear effects and technological complexity. This article seeks to launch a new conversation about the technological uncertainties that would complicate a nuclear first-use strategy. By simulating a counterforce strike from the US Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system against China’s new ICBM silo fields near Yumen, Hami and Ordos, I identify deep uncertainties and possible failure modes that are overlooked in recent literature on nuclear counterforce. My analysis shows that China’s land-based second-strike force is not as vulnerably as other analysts have assumed.

Author

• Christopher Lawrence, Georgetown University