Rally the Vote: Electoral Competition with Direct Campaign Communication

• In Event: Poster Session: Predicting Political Participation

Abstract

Political rallies have formed a large part of U.S. electoral campaigns since the 19th century and remain relevant today. This paper models candidates' rally decisions as an empirical dynamic game of electoral competition and applies it to estimate rally effectiveness for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The model supports three empirically observed patterns, such as candidates concentrating rallies in states with neck and neck competition as election approaches. Estimates uncover that rallies by presidential candidates were effective in increasing their poll margins and these effects remain significant across multiple robustness tests. The estimates also reveal that a rally by a presidential candidate is more persuasive than a television ad. I construct and execute model selection tests that infer whether candidates are strategic and forward-looking to validate model assumptions. Counterfactual exercises show that Trump’s rallies were electorally pivotal, while rallies by other candidates had no effect on their chances of winning. The effects of short-term campaign silences (i.e. forbidding political campaigning) are limited since candidates can gain sufficient support from the electorate before they begin.

Draft Link: https://anubhavpcjha.github.io/files/pol_rally_and_pop_draft.pdf

Author

• Anubhav Jha, Princeton University