Incumbent Resilience and Service Delivery in Africa

• In Event: Elite Politics in Africa (Panel I)

Abstract

Previous literature has highlighted the widespread favoritism in service delivery for political survival among African political elites, though some have cautioned that the types of public goods may bias findings. This paper demonstrates that the source of funding also matters in distributive politics in Africa. Utilizing an original database encompassing all public investment projects approved by the Zambian Ministry of Finance at the district level from 2000 to 2021, across various sectors and financiers, this study unveils nuanced patterns in distributive politics. The findings reveal that hard infrastructure projects funded through the domestic budget and demand-driven Chinese finance exhibit higher fungibility, preferentially channeled to the stronghold regions of the incumbent. In contrast, soft infrastructure projects and those financed by OECD and traditional international financial institutions demonstrate lower fungibility. By shedding light on the intricate interplay between funding sources, project types, political elites' distribution considerations, and service delivery, this research advances a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics shaping political landscapes and governance in Africa.

Author

• Keyi Tang, ESADE Business School