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Despite a growing body of research examining the stability of cabinets in authoritarian regimes, few studies examine the selection of cabinet ministers by leaders. Why do authoritarian leaders select individuals to be cabinet ministers? How does minister selection influence the subsequent stability of the cabinet? I begin to answer these questions by examining the selection and retention of ministers by four African leaders: Paul Biya, Abdou Diouf, Daniel arap Moi, and Ali Hassan Mwinyi. As veteran cabinet members who obtained their positions through regular leadership transitions, these leaders formed their cabinets in well-established political environments that they knew well. Each of these leaders was also vulnerable to challenges from other regime elites as they established their administrations. After descriptively analyzing the cabinet management of each leader, I develop a theory linking cabinet stability to minister selection.