Reputation for Sharing Power

• In Event: Elite Politics in Africa (Panel I)

Abstract

The agency problem facing elites in autocratic regimes is a well-known phenomenon. Elites are willing to declare political allegiance to the leader, but may fear the leader's ambitions to concentrate power, thereby failing to fulfill his power-sharing obligations. This creates a tension between the leader's desire to consolidate power and the elites' desire to protect their interests. I examine the role that reputation concerns can play in this dynamic. The theoretical framework I develop has an opportunistic leader who faces an infinite sequence of short-lived elites and decides whether to politically include or politically exclude them, conditional on the elites' support. The elites initially believe there are chances the leader is the commitment type who is dedicated to sharing power conditional on support. I find that an opportunistic leader builds a good reputation for sharing power, and sometimes leverages that reputation to exclude elites and consolidate power. At times when the elites are likely to make a correct inference about the leader's actions, sharing power is necessary because the leader has a reputation to preserve. This paper illuminates the logic behind the high frequency of cabinet reshuffling in Africa without leadership upheaval.

Author

• Gaetan Nandong, New York University