Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Economic downturns frequently precipitate political upheavals, making the strategies employed by top leadership during such crises pivotal for political stability. This study delves into the repercussions of financial crises on ministerial appointments in Africa. We argue that leaders facing economic downturns reshuffle their cabinet and, in particular, replace economic portfolio-holding ministers to avoid blame. Their choices could lean towards appointing adept technocrats for effective crisis management or elites that represent alliances for patronage-led survival. Utilizing an original dataset on the backgrounds and expertise of 5,000 distinct African ministers, we evaluate the impact of exogenous economic shocks on leaders' political decision-making concerning ministerial roles. We also investigate the role of different types of political regimes in state leaders’ approaches to cabinet reshuffles during economic crises. Our findings reveal the effect of external shocks on strategies for political survival across different regime types and contribute to the broader discourse on the relationship between economic development and political elites.