Impact of Winning and Losing on Affective Polarization during Campaign Period

• In Event: How to Increase Polarization

Abstract

Affective polarization refers to the degree to which citizens like and trust the elites and supporters of their preferred party and dislike and distrust supporters of opposing parties. Studies have shown that, in both the U.S. and comparative contexts, political campaigns and the salience of elections have a great influence on the change of affective polarization. As Hernandez et al. (2021) note, these findings imply that “the very institution that lies at the core of liberal democracy (competitive free elections) becomes also a source of strain for democratic politics by promoting affective polarization (2).”
However, while these findings highlight the role of elections in fostering affective polarization, the causal mechanisms remain unclear. What features of elections would trigger a more strengthened partisan attachment that would, therefore, augment the difference between a partisan’s favorability toward the own party and animosity toward the out-party? Exploring these can offer valuable insights into the nature of affective polarization and its inherent connection to democratic processes.
Focusing on the most salient nature of elections, winning and losing, I explore how partisans’ perceptions of their favored party’s electoral chances during ongoing campaigns (i.e., whether their party’s status is reassured or threatened in an electoral context) would influence their affective evaluations toward in-party and out-party. In addition, I investigate whether partisans’ changes in evaluations of in-party and out-party during campaigns are instigated by different motives when exposed to different messages in terms of their party’s election status. In this study, reassurance or threat to partisans’ ingroup status is operationalized as the marginal difference in projected vote share between their in-party and out-party under two conditions. One condition presents a 10-point lead, signaling a projected win and reassurance of the party’s status. The other condition, with a 10-point deficit, implies a projected loss, indicating a threat to the party's status.
By conducting a survey experiment using a nationally representative sample in the United States a few months before the 2024 presidential election, grounded in social psychology theory, I expect to find the following findings:
First, when partisans receive information suggesting that their preferred party is leading the competing party during campaigns, with the projection of winning, they will feel proud of being a member of the party and feel reassured as their party’s status is perceived to be secure. As a result, I expect they will exhibit stronger favorability for their party through the identity confirmation function, with the goal of showcasing the superiority of their party. On the other hand, when partisans receive information indicating that their preferred party is behind the competing party, with the projection of losing, they will feel more threatened as their party’s status in the electoral context is deemed unsafe. I expect this situation will induce them to favor their preferred party more. In response to the perceived threat during the campaign, individuals may, under the instrumental function, express heightened favorability towards their party to inspire the group, boost morale, and intensify efforts in an endeavor to alter the unfavorable situation where their party lags behind the competing party. Partisans may like their party more as a psychological defense mechanism to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup, despite the unfavorable electoral projection.
Second, when partisans perceive their preferred party leading during the campaign period without a perceived threat from the out-party, maintaining positive interparty distinctiveness, I expect their evaluations of the out-party to resemble scenarios without the projection of their party winning, aligning with social psychology findings on the limited consistent correlation between ingroup favoritism and outgroup dislike. Additionally, anticipating more out-party dislike when their party is projected to lose, aligning with the Realistic Conflict Theory, which posits a stronger reciprocal relationship in situations of intergroup competition and perceived threats to ingroup interests.
Finally, I expect greater overall affective polarization among partisans, regardless of their party’s projected outcome in campaigns, compared to scenarios without such information. Moreover, those perceiving their party as losing are expected to exhibit higher affective polarization than those perceiving victory, expressing increased favorability toward their preferred party and heightened dislike toward the opposing party simultaneously, while the latter group's feelings toward the opposing party are expected to remain relatively constant.
As a PhD candidate in the midst of my dissertation, presenting my paper within the Political Psychology division holds immense value for my academic growth.

Author

• Yu-Shiuan Huang