Elite Bargains, Democratic Resilience and Economic Change in Nigeria

• In Event: Elite Politics in Africa (Panel II)

Abstract

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic recently concluded its sixth electoral cycle and will soon mark twenty-five years of continuous civilian rule. This is a milestone for a country that was embroiled in political instability (and recurrent military intervention) during its first four decades of independence. The resilience of the regime owes much to power-sharing arrangements among politicians and distributive bargains among civilian and military elites. The political party system has low institutionalization, as organizations are fluid and politicians contend mainly over economic benefits. An elite cartel centered on rent distribution has stabilized the polity while equally impeding economic development. The legacy of state-led import substitution and petroleum-funded populism has been supplanted with a pragmatic focus on macroeconomic stabilization and incremental market reforms. However, this managerial approach has neither reigned in the profligacy of the petroleum sector, nor expanded the economy beyond natural resources and a few non-tradables. Slow growth, extensive poverty and persistent spatial inequalities have given rise to escalating levels of violence and insecurity across the federation. The paper analyses the incentives of politicians and the absence of programmatic parties at the heart of Nigeria’s “violent democracy.”

Author

• Peter M. Lewis, Johns Hopkins University