How Shared Identities Shape Elite Defection under Autocracy

• In Event: Elite Politics in Africa (Panel II)

Abstract

Dictatorships are more likely to collapse when ruling elites defect, joining or creating opposition movements aimed at toppling the regime. But existing theories of elite defection under autocracy—which emphasize the role of patronage, formal institutions, or exogenous shocks—struggle to explain why, even within the same regime or same time period, some officials quit while others remain loyal. Introducing original, minister-level data from several African autocracies, I first show that elites who have longstanding personal ties or shared backgrounds (i.e., common ethnic, regional, educational, or prior occupational status) with the dictators they serve are significantly less likely to defect than elites who lack these shared ties. Then, drawing on semi-structured interviews with more than a dozen ex-ministers in Kenya, I propose two causal mechanisms: common identities or shared pasts are more likely to (a) generate strong bonds of interpersonal trust and loyalty and (b) distort the information elites receive, such that elites do not defect even when dictators are on the verge of losing power. The research sheds light on the personal and political networks that underpin autocracies and helps advance our understanding of authoritarian survival in an age of democratic recession.

Author

• Andrew Wojtanik, University of California - Berkeley