Iron Fist of Development: Coercive Institutions and Public Services

• In Event: Historical Political Economy of the Middle East

Abstract

Recent advances in the literature on state capacity highlight the varying types of capacity building and their distinct political economy implications. While building administrative and infrastructural capacities is often seen as crucial for sustainable development and democratization, investments in coercive state institutions are typically linked to a decreased likelihood of democratic transitions and an increase in state violence. Our paper challenges this conventional view by suggesting that coercive state institutions can actually improve the legibility of diverse populations and broaden the state’s reach. These institutions may address political obstacles that cause underinvestment in public services in ’brown areas,’ potentially aiding development. To support our argument, we utilize an original dataset from early Republican-era Turkey (1923-1950), which includes information on the Inspectorates General — regional governorships with comprehensive authority over civil, military, and judicial matters — along with data on public service investments and developmental outcomes. Employing differences-in-differences and geographic discontinuity designs, our analysis demonstrates that coercive institutions enable states to address legibility and territorial challenges. This leads to an ”inward conquest” of brown areas through public investments, supporting development.

Authors

• Berfin Baydar, Duke University

• Pablo Beramendi, Duke University

• Asli Cansunar, University of Washington