Force, Persuasion, and Sincerity in John Locke’s Evangelism

• In Event: New Directions in the Study of Locke

Abstract

John Locke’s doctrine of religious toleration facilitated what he considered to be a method of religious conversion more effective than coercive force. In his mature writings on toleration force, figured as physical coercion or the unlawful deprivation of property to illicit a certain profession or expression of religious belief, was a thoroughly inadequate way to convert people to the “true religion”. The effect of such force was, according to Locke, to create dissidents, or perhaps worse, mere conformers. To avoid punishment under such a policy, individuals were incentivized to profess loyalty and perform the necessary acts of worship while inwardly remaining uncommitted. Force was thus not an effective way of moving someone to sincerely embrace an alternative religious doctrine. On the contrary, it created insincere subjects, who by this insincerity undermined the integrity of “true” Christian belief and, just as critically, undermined the trust Locke considered so central to a healthy political community.

Persuasion, exhortation, and advice – methods of conversion available within a condition of Lockean toleration, were able to reach inner belief and produce sincere conversion (and thus good subjects). Locke, however, spends relatively little time elaborating on precisely what persuasion looks like in practice. Furthermore, he muddies the water by, on the one hand, speaking approvingly of the force of the Gospel itself and framing rational persuasion as operating on assent in a way akin to a force. On the other, Locke condemns the “ungrounded persuasions of their own minds” of the “Enthusiasts” who claimed direct revelation from God. Accordingly, in the paper, I examine force and persuasion, including its many variants – admonitions, entreaties, advice, counsel, and arguments - in Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia and subsequent polemical exchanges with Jonas Proast, as well as the “Second Treatise of Government,” his recently discovered manuscript Reasons for tolerateing Papists, the Essay on the Poor Law, and his scattered notes on “Atlantis”. I draw upon such a range of texts to show that conversion was a consistent concern of Locke’s and not limited to his rhetorical strategy against Jonas Proast in the “Letters.”

Locke famously prohibits the magistrate from using force to change a person’s religious convictions. He does not, however, preclude the magistrate from employing exhortations, admonitions, and advice for this end. Locke also envisaged a prominent role for the magistrate and local officials in policing vice. Briefly mentioned in the Epistola and elaborated upon in the later “Letters” addressed to Proast and other writings, Locke urged the magistrate to use his coercive prerogative to stamp out sexual promiscuity, debauchery, fraud, and idleness. As with unlawful force, such behaviors were destructive to the wellbeing of the commonwealth, and they inhibited discovery and affirmation of “true religion.” By punishing vice, the magistrate could better create the conditions for conversion to “true religion” as well as produce good subjects. Coercive force thus reappears in Locke’s evangelical strategy. Ultimately, rather than neatly excising political power from the religious realm, Locke envisaged and endorsed a Christian morality enforced by the state.

Author

• Julia Brown, University of Chicago