Legislative Effectiveness, Electoral Anticipation, and Garnering Campaign Advantage in the United States Senate

• In Event: Political Parties and American Democracy Mini-Conference II: Effective Lawmaking and Compromise in Congress and the States

Abstract

Do U.S. Senators anticipate an electoral cost for legislative ineffectiveness? Do they garner electoral payoffs if they successfully act on this electoral incentive by being more effective prior to re-election? Using original data on Senate primaries since 1980, we find that Senators strategically adjust their effectiveness ahead of an election by becoming more effective: (1) when they are in-cycle; (2) in the two preceding Congresses prior to re-election; and (3) than Senators that choose to voluntarily retire. Given this strategic adjustment, we find that effective Senators can deter intra-party quality challengers and raise their probability of renomination. We also find that the relationship between effectiveness and electoral success to be mediated by a fundraising advantage, with Senators turning strategic effectiveness into a primary election fundraising advantage over challengers that can serve to deter competition and boost re-election prospects. These findings providing insight into how strategic effectiveness translates to electoral advantage.

Author

• Carlos Algara, Claremont Graduate University