Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
The growing political prominence of illiberal actors in liberal democratic polities has added urgency to an ongoing debate about how democracies respond to illiberalism. Much of this discussion has focused on structural facilitators of democratic defense, underestimating the political dynamics driving institutional responses to illiberalism. This article develops a dynamic model to capture the factors driving change from institutional tolerance of, to defense against, ascending illiberalism. The model takes into account the tactical dilemmas over the use of institutional measures against ascending illiberals. Documenting the “tactical oscillation” of moderate actors, the article shows how democratic defense is integral to the competitive dynamics between the government and the opposition and between ideologically proximate and distant actors to the illiberals. Leveraging empirical evidence from Greece, the article documents the tactical dilemmas of moderate actors over the treatment of one of the most illiberal actors in Europe, the Golden Dawn. It then shows how the resolution of these dilemmas helped bring about a major shift from democratic tolerance to militancy. The analysis highlights the temporal specificity of institutional responses and casts new light on the tactical incentives of moderate actors, especially those most ideologically proximate to the illiberals, to repress them.