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Historically, extremist parties have engaged in a process of parliamentary disruption, violating the rules of interaction, and slowing down the legislative process. How can democratic parties respond to these strategies and counter parliamentary erosion? This paper examines the political reforms adopted in Third Republic France and Weimar Germany which sought to defend parliamentarism. I propose a typology of the policies of parliamentary defense and an explanation of partisan demand for different policies that target individual or collective groups of legislators. I document that French legislators took a much more decisive approach in the defense of parliamentary institutions as compared to German lawmakers and show that this difference can be attributed to the more proactive position of the French Socialist party. While existing research on democratic erosion has highlighted the role of center-right parties in explaining regime breakdown, this paper demonstrates that in explaining parliamentary erosion, we need to consider the strategies of all mainstream parties and not just parties on the right.