Authoritarian Judicial Balancing: Distributional Conflict and Court Dependence

• In Event: Judiciaries in Democracy and Autocracy

Abstract

How do autocrats stay in power when threats from elites and the masses escalate and collide? Focusing on the context of progressive labor law reforms, this study advances a novel theory that elucidates how autocrats take advantage of limited independent courts to balance the intensified elite-mass conflict. When autocrats have greater control over the judiciary, they can exploit the courts to rule in favor of either capital or labor, depending on which side poses a greater threat to the regime. To test this theory, I assemble and geo-reference comprehensive court rulings data on labor disputes, which are then used in a difference-in-differences analysis that exploits subnational variation in levels of judicial independence in China. The results indicate that more dependent courts are more sensitive than their less dependent counterparts to the pressures exerted by both business influence and labor threats, and adapt their adjudication of labor disputes accordingly. Utilizing quantitative cross-country evidence, I further establish that, consistent with the theory's broader implication, autocrats are more likely to adopt pro-worker reforms in response to bottom-up demands when they can leverage judicial balancing. This study contributes to our understanding of authoritarian institutions and survival strategies amid distributive tensions.

Author

• Hsu Yumin Wang, Emory University