Complexity, Public Salience, and the Congressional Delegation

• In Event: The Relationship between the Legislature and Other Political Institutions

Abstract

Scholars have extensively studied the reasons behind Congress's selective delegation within policy areas. However, existing studies often overlook the collective influence of complexity and public salience on delegation decisions. This article employs a game theoretical model to illustrate how Congress's choices regarding delegation and the extent of discretion granted to agencies are affected by the complexity and salience of policy areas. The analysis suggests that as the complexity of the issue area increases, Congress is more likely to delegate to the agency, granting broad discretion to the Agency. Conversely, the higher the salience of a policy area, the less likely Congress is to delegate and more likely to limit agencies' discretion. Based on Mayhew’s (1991) list of important legislation in the postwar era, this paper explores how the inclination towards delegation has evolved in the complexity and public salience of policy issues. The aim is to shed light on whether the discretion of delegation practice favors the bureau more and the potential peril it poses to democracy.

Author

• Yao Yao, University of Georgia