Diaspora Voting: A New Item on the "Menu of Manipulation"?

• In Event: Learning from Global Democratic Challenges and Innovations Mini-Conference III: Migration as Part of the Authoritarian Toolkit

Abstract

Since 1990, over 100 countries have extended voting rights to their citizens abroad. Although diaspora voting can be argued as a mechanism for increased inclusion, the potential for governments to employ diaspora voting as a form of electoral manipulation is both theoretically feasible and empirically evident. Drawing on Schedler’s classic “Menu of Manipulation” (2003), this article explores how choices in the organization and implementation of voting abroad can serve as new strategies for violating democratic norms. We identify numerous points of potential manipulation of diaspora voting throughout the election process that correspond with Schedler’s “chain of democratic choice” at both individual and institutional levels. We also look beyond country of origin policies to consider how country of residence can also manipulate both the range of choices offered to diaspora voters as well as the formation of preferences. Cases of diaspora voting manipulation, including elections in Italy, Ghana, and Russia, illuminate the diversity of emerging tactics. Our study demonstrates how transnational voting is now a new item on the menu of election fraud.

Authors

• Nathan Allen, St. Francis Xavier University

• Elizabeth Iams Wellman, University of Memphis