Social Reputation, Public Opinion, and US Nuclear Non-use in the Cold War

• In Event: Ethical and Security Implication of Nuclear and Emerging Technologies

Abstract

By 1953, US policymakers lamented that a “nuclear taboo” limited their military options. Since then, many scholars argue, the use of nuclear weapons has become “unthinkable.” Yet deterrence and US security policy are predicated on perceptions of US willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to dire security emergencies. In this paper, I reexamine these tensions in the nuclear taboo and argue that US leaders’ concern for social reputation and global public backlash contributed to their reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the Cold War. Whatever their own normative beliefs, leaders worried about the reputational fallout from violating norms they perceived others to subscribe. US leaders have both taken seriously the nuclear option and sought to avoid public condemnation for being perceived as aggressive, irresponsible, or racist for initiating nuclear use in Asia. This argument taps into pressures for conformity with nuclear and other norms and is related to but distinct from purely normative explanations. As a result, “reputation talk” is different than “taboo talk” and cannot serve as evidence to support a nuclear taboo. Thus, norms shaped US decision-making but through a logic of consequences, rather than a logic of appropriateness. Moreover, if US public aversion to the bomb is eroding as some recent studies suggest, this suggests that US leaders may no longer face what they once saw as one powerful constraint on their nuclear decision-making.

Author

• Jennifer L. Erickson, Boston College