Can Automating Nuclear Deterrence Avoid Conflict? Evidence from UK MPs

• In Event: Leaders, International Conflict, and Peaceful Possibilities

Abstract

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercion? Given the increase in violent conflict around the world, nuclear threats by Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, the collapse of foundational nuclear arms control agreements, and China’s large-scale investment in increasing their nuclear arsenal, this is a critical question for international security. However, while prominent scholars like Thomas Schelling argue that nuclear brinkmanship, or the manipulation of nuclear risk, can effectively coerce adversaries, others contend nuclear weapons are not effective tools of coercion. To test these competing theories, we plan to conduct an experiment on members of the United Kingdom public, as well as an elite sample––UK Members of Parliament––which will enable us to make credible causal inferences about the impact of nuclear brinksmanship on threat credibility and effectiveness. We will also theorize and test how automating nuclear use––a real, even if terrifying, possibility given recent advances in technology––impacts the efficacy of nuclear brinksmanship relative to when humans fully control the use of nuclear weapons. The results will contribute to the literatures on coercion, weapons of mass destruction, and emerging technologies.

Author

• Joshua Schwartz, Carnegie Mellon University