Lucid Leaders: Declining Powers and Threat Credibility

• In Event: Leaders, International Conflict, and Peaceful Possibilities

Abstract

Does absolute and/or relative decline in power influence a leader’s ability to make credible threats? We hypothesize that leaders of declining states are able to make more credible threats. In particular, we argue that states on the receiving end of a threat from a declining power are more likely to take the threat seriously because they have observed decline in the declining power and believe that given the leader would only make a threat if they intend to carry it out. Employing a mixed-methods design, we first examine the relationship between decline and dispute reciprocation using a large-N statistical analysis. We then field three national surveys in the United States, United Kingdom, and India to examine, cross-nationally, whether perceptions of decline shape how average citizens perceive the credibility of threats made by leaders of declining powers. We find support for our hypothesis that leaders of declining powers are able to make more credible threats. This research has implications for the US-China relations, great power competition, and for our understanding of credibility, power shifts, and the prospects for war and peace in the international system.

Authors

• Donald Casler, University of Illinois

• Robert Ralston, University of Birmingham