Nokware: the Political Epistemology of Kwasi Wiredu and Akan Philosophy

• In Event: Global Decolonial Politics and Black Liberation

Abstract

Throughout his writings on philosophy of culture, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language, the late Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu (1931-2022) develops a distinction between two separate notions of truth in his native Akan language. The first moral notion of truth is nokware, which translates to “one voice,” the idea being that one speaks the truth when saying to the community what one would say to oneself. It has also been suggested that this oneness of voice implies communal unanimity, such that the truth is that which is agreed upon by the community. The second, cognitive notion of truth, nea ete saa is a phrase roughly translating to what is the case or “what is so.” Interestingly the opposite of nokware, or the moral notion of truth in Akan, is not falsity but lies. This signals profound resonances with the political account of truth offered in Hannah Arendt’s (1961) writings but also that the Akan language is perfectly capable of formulating a universal problem of political philosophy, namely, the relationship between the moral and cognitive notions of truth. This paper explores both connections while also supporting Wiredu’s additional argument that much research published under the banner of political epistemology in Anglo-American thought explores narrow linguistic problems that only arise due to the peculiar vocabulary of the English language rather than universal philosophical insights. It concludes by reflecting on Wiredu’s significance for the study of the political-philosophical problem of the relationship between truth and power.

Author

• Gregory Evan Doukas, University of Memphis