Policymaking during Coalition Formation Period in Parliamentary Democracies

• In Event: New Perspectives on Policymaking

Abstract

Despite its necessary presence in multi-party systems due to the time needed to make coalition governments, caretaker governance has been a largely forgotten piece in the study of coalition lifecycle because of its short tenure and the presumed lack of political influence. As coalition bargaining duration shows an upward trend in Western Europe, more and more often incumbent governments undertake the role of caretakers for a time until the new full-fledged government can be sworn in. While conventional expectations require caretaker parties to refrain from making major policy commitments, extant anecdotal evidence shows that ministers do take advantage of the caretaking period by slipping in last-minute bills. However, how do the policy positions of the legislation proposed by the caretakers correlate to their governing prospects in the next legislative period? This paper focuses on the potential privileges of the Prime Minister (PM) party. Using original data on caretaker cabinets and legislative records in 14 parliamentary democracies covering Western Europe and the major Westminster countries in the postwar era, the paper suggests that policy changes under the caretaker government would be more often if the incumbent PM party has a better prospect of entering the next government. Given such observations, further questions on incumbent advantage and parties’ continuation prospect for coalition governance in multi-party democracies can be raised.

Author

• Mingyi Zhang, University of Zurich