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This paper analyzes how social interactions, ethnic geography, and other factors, affect the deployment and tenure of regional executives in Kenya under two presidents- Moi and Kibaki. We leverage administrative dataset on district commissioners (DCs) compiled by Carter & Hassan (2020) in a linear-in-means regression discontinuity design (RD), and Cox proportional hazard regressions. We investigate RD stability using relative treatment effects derivative. Social interactions is measured by the number of work stations a DC in a particular district has served relative to a countrywide average. Where such stations are fewer, we infer stronger social networks. Ethnic geography is proxied by a dummy for misaligned district. Misaligned districts constitute non-core political bases. We establish negligible discontinuity in the probability that a DC is non-native around the social interactions’ cutoff for Moi. Under Kibaki, this probability changes from about 88% to 96% around the cutoff. Non-native officers were likelier to govern in non-core, or smaller, districts during Moi’s era; this bias is non-existent for Kibaki. Under both regimes, long-serving DCs were co-ethnics to majority residents in the districts they governed. In terms of tenure, officers were rapidly shuffled in non-core districts. As social interactions rose (or networks weakened), Kibaki rapidly shuffled officers. Raising social interactions above the threshold lengthened officer’s tenure. We refrain from drawing suggestions for policy action.