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Conquering powers routinely adopt state-directed nationalization projects that seek to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the national identity of the conquering power and discriminate against those who do not. This article develops a formal model that illuminates when such policies succeed or fail. We show that the effectiveness of discrimination hinges on the perceived longevity of rule by the conquering power. If the popular perception is that such rule will be short-lived, then discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents exert greater effort to transmit the marginalized national identity to their children. This intense intergenerational socialization more than compensates for the negative wealth effects of discrimination. If, on the other hand, rule under the conquering power is perceived to be long-lasting, then discrimination will achieve the aims for which it is intended. Case studies on the Chilean occupation of Tacna, PerĂº (1880-1929) and the Prussian occupation of the Danish-German border region of Schleswig-Holstein (1866-1920) illustrate the logic of the model.