Exploring the Transformative Potential of Political Parties

• In Event: Normative Reflections on Parties & Elections

Abstract

Democrats are becoming increasingly aware of the virtues of sortition. The random selection of legislators is in many important ways fairer than other electoral systems and teases a system that might reverse aspects of democratic decline around the world. But for all of sortition’s virtues as a democratic ideal, specific proposals for implementing it in the non-ideal state of affairs appear either less fair than the status quo or simply infeasible. Adding an additional chamber elected via sortition, for instance, will, if anything, exacerbate the problems of corporate capture. Implementing sortition in legislative assemblies is in any event unlikely because the individuals making up the assembly will have been selected by the previous electoral system and have systematic biases towards it. While changes to electoral systems do occur, they are almost always minor. Given the radical nature of sortition compared with status quo institutions, the prospects for implementation appear at first glance grim.

In this paper we propose a specific form of sortition that we believe coherently approximates the ideal in a feasible way. This is the idea that parties or factions randomly pre-select candidates they plan to run at the next election from a pool of their members. Pre-selections are typically conducted via a vote of members, which is prone to manipulation in the form of agenda-setting, strategic voting, and even branch-stacking. The process is criticized for perpetuating descriptive and substantive misrepresentation. We argue (with Dowding and Giuliani, MS) that sortition for party pre-selections in a non-ideal world approximates the ideal virtues typically associated with sortition.
But we also argue that it is the more feasible version because it is an electorally viable strategy. We do not need legislation to enforce it (pace Dowding and Giuliani, MS). While running a winner of a party sortition against a professional politician selected by the powers of the party machine is going to be electorally suboptimal, we argue that other electoral benefits outweigh this drawback.

We posit that the structure of the mechanism itself acts as an incentive for individuals to embrace the system voluntarily. A key aspect of our argument revolves around the interplay between the concepts of ideology and participation. Sortition within parties not only makes individuals more inclined to participate but also encourages them to join party memberships. We argue that this dual effect produces direct and indirect advantages for both party constituencies and party leaders alike.
In essence, our paper seeks to shed light on the transformative potential of integrating random selection within political parties, emphasizing its capacity to enhance democratic values and foster a more inclusive and representative political landscape. Through a comprehensive exploration of the proposed strategies, we contend that the adoption of sortition within parties can pave the way for a more robust and participatory democratic system.

Authors

• Adriano Giuliani, LUMSA University and Australian National University

• William Bosworth, Australian National University