Prestige and Strategy in Russian Nuclear Decision Making

• In Event: Russian Foreign Policy

Abstract

Concerns regarding prestige and strategic goals both play an important role in Russian nuclear policy. Russian perception of strategic stability incorporates both ensuring the ability to launch a retaliatory second strike against a nuclear-armed adversary and maintaining rough parity with the United States. Moscow's engagement with Washington regarding arms control in the second half of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st were driven by strategic imperatives and a desire to maintain interaction with the United States in the one area Russia was still treated as an equal. Similarly, both a desire to maintain a nuclear triad as a symbol of Russian status and a strategic imperative to maintain a retaliatory strike capability vis-a-vis the United States have influenced weapons procurement and force structure decisions.
This paper seeks to understand which nuclear policy areas are more prestige-driven and which are more strategy-driven. Additionally, I seek to understand what factors may elevate the influence of prestige over that of strategy–and vice versa–over time. I argue that Russia prioritizes strategic concerns when strategic competition with its peer nuclear competitor–the United States–is intense, while prestige plays a more central role during periods of amicable U.S.-Russia relations. A leader's personality also plays an important role, with the influence of prestige increasing when leaders that place a significant emphasis on status competition come to power and is reduced when leaders seek to achieve status ambitions through cooperation with the United States. Finally, I argue that strategic concerns play a greater role than prestige in nuclear policy when conditions that favor each–such as intense competition with the United States over security-related issues and the presence of a status leader in the Kremlin–but that prestige concerns can play a role in selecting competing policy options when multiple could address Russian security concerns.
While this paper focuses on the nuclear politics of Russia and the Soviet Union, it can provide lessons that are applicable to a broader range of cases. Scholars have noted both strategic interests and status ambitions as important drivers of nuclear policy in other contexts, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and France. Both factors may also drive proliferation decisions. While certain features of Russian nuclear policy are unique to Russia–or narrowly applicable to Russia and a smaller subset of nuclear-armed states–many strategic and domestic political phenomena are experienced by all or most members of the nuclear club. All nuclear-armed states face variations in the level and nature of threats from rivals. All nuclear-armed states have domestic factions advocating for advancing the greatness of the state. All nuclear-armed states have seen leadership turnover, with new leaders bringing new priorities, operational codes, and varying levels of interest in nuclear policy. By exploring how these elements influenced Russian nuclear policy, this paper generates broadly applicable knowledge that advances our understanding of foreign policy selection and nuclear politics in political science and that can be applied to understand nuclear policy dynamics in other cases better.

Author

• Spenser A. Warren, University of California