From Deterrence to Moral Hazards: Alliance Commitment Dynamics in East Asia

• In Event: Security Dynamics in East Asia

Abstract

The South Korea-US alliance was established in 1953 and has endured for nearly 70 years. Although this alliance was publicized under the 1953 alliance treaty, the dynamics of the alliance relationship were not static but have changed over time. In other words, each side's level of military cooperative actions has not remained constant during the last 70 years. Considering the variations of military commitments in the alliance, this paper examines how do protégés and their adversaries react to varying levels of alliance peacetime behaviors exhibited by alliance patrons. I argue that the level of a patron's military behaviors during peacetime significantly influences the decisions made by the protégé and its adversaries to initiate militarized interstate disputes. When patrons provide strong military support and assistance, protégés are more likely to feel emboldened. Alliances with high credibility in security assurance may encourage minor states to take more military actions, thereby increasing the probability of militarized conflict with their adversary. On the other hand, when the protégé receives only a lower level of alliance military behaviors, it may suggest a lack of strong commitment from the patron, which in turn could undermine the credibility of military support. Consequently, the protégé is less likely to initiate conflicts due to the perceived lack of assurance in the patron's military backing.

Author

• Jinwon Lee, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign