Cognition and Choice in 1962: A New Explanation for U.S. Nuclear Decision-Making

• In Event: Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Abstract

Abstract: The Cuban missile crisis remains an analytic touchstone for scholars of American foreign policy and decision-making in the nuclear age. Early accounts by historians, psychologists, and political scientists tended to valorize the actions of President Kennedy, portraying him as a national hero with an uncanny ability to stay cool under pressure while standing tall against the Soviet Union and his own military advisors. Later studies modified this perspective, updating and expanding the historical record, and exposing his serious medical conditions, personal peccadillos, and remarkable eye for orchestrating his domestic political image. At times he appears to be at least as concerned with avoiding electoral defeat in 1962 and 1964, as he was committed to averting a potential nuclear war. it is now known that he systematically concealed the diplomatic contributions of his non-military advisors, particularly those who crafted the very policies that allowed peace to prevail. Why was the president so eager to protect his political image? And how did the advice of his military and non-military advisors shape or constrain his policy choices? Does the evidence now support a new understanding of American foreign policy actions in 1962? This paper will employ the Cognitive Calculus Theory of Decision-Making and offer a new analytic perspective on the Cuban missile crisis and discuss the implications of this work for future studies of American and comparative foreign policy.

Author

• Lori Helene Gronich, George Washington University