Putting Ethics Back into 'Political' Political Theory

• In Event: Revisiting Core Concepts in Political Philosophy

Abstract

Jeremy Waldron proposes an approach to political theory that he calls ‘political’ political theory. In explicit opposition to ‘non-political’ ideal theory, Waldron argues (1) that political theory must focus on ‘lower’-order questions that are fundamental to politics, such as how to produce legitimate collective decisions in conditions of deep disagreement, and (2) that political theory must take political institutions more seriously. Only so, according to him, can political theory provide guidance on how to improve current practices right here, right now. Yet so-called realists maintain that Waldron’s political political theory is not as political as he believes. According to them, even though Waldron should be applauded for trying to reorientate political theory towards real life circumstances, he ends up incorporating moral considerations and methodological tools when evaluating and designing institutions. Realists charge Waldron of failing to observe the distinctiveness and autonomy of the political sphere from other spheres of human life, and for advancing his own ideal theories of sorts. Accordingly, realists maintain Waldron’s political political theory cannot actually provide guidance on how to improve current practices right here, right now.

I argue that the problem with Waldron’s political political theory is not that it is a sort of ideal theory. We have good reason to believe that all brands of political theory – including realism – contain at least some degree of idealism. Rather, my thesis is that the problem with Waldron’s political political theory is that it overcorrects the tendency in political theory to neglect political institutions. In order for political political theory to provide guidance on how to improve current practices right here, right now, it must concern itself with what I call ‘non-ideal political ethics’. After all, even if political political theory can discern what political institutions ought to look like, someone needs to implement them – and that person will find him/herself in non-ideal circumstances. Moreover, there are pressing political problems that existing political institutions alone cannot adequately address. In short, I argue for a more comprehensive sort of political political theory that gives political ethics its due.

At the heart of my argument lies a critique of realism. Realists claim that political theory can only truly be political if it respects the distinction between the political and the non-political: political institutions (and behaviour) must be evaluated according to political rather than moral values, for political values arise from the practice of politics itself and cannot be abstracted concrete historical contexts and power relations. So, as an example, political institutions should be considered legitimate not on the basis of whether they treat all subjects as human beings with dignity, but rather on the basis of whether they are justified intelligibly and without manipulation to each subject: if the political institutions in question reproduce existing power hierarchies, then they serve to entrench domination, in which case they are illegitimate.

I show that realism itself does not respect the distinction between the political and the non-political. Realists presuppose that equality is categorically important for the legitimation of political institutions; each subject must be offered an intelligible justification without manipulation. Realists trace this basic legitimation demand to the fact that no political order can persist if too many subjects deem its political institutions illegitimate. Yet the vast majority of political orders in history have been justified in ways that did not respect the equality of their subjects – in ways that furthered domination, according to realists – and many of these political orders were able to sustain themselves for long periods of time. While this does not necessarily negate the realist claim that there does exist a distinctively political requirement that all forms of political order somehow be legitimated, it does call into question whether the demand that this requirement be fulfilled on egalitarian terms actually emerges from the political. Accordingly, I argue that realists likely derive this understanding of the basic legitimation demand from a moral intuition, taken subconsciously from ethics, that all human beings count the same and/or be treated as subjects with dignity. In other words, what realists are actually aiming towards is a particular egalitarian interpretation of a more basic legitimation demand. Realists are conducting their own version of ideal theory. On this basis, I suggest that even though realists are right to characterize Waldron’s political political theory as an ideal theory of sorts, all political theory is likely ideal theory to some extent. The problem with Waldron’s political political theory does not lie in the fact that it involves some degree of idealism.

Author

• Eric Cheng, Waseda University