Why Strong Autocratic Elites Allow Leaders to Monopolize Power

• In Event: Elites Loyalty and the Survival of Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Dictators often wrestle power away from their regime members to monopolize power. Sometimes, the autocratic elite is too weak to resist it. But other elites are strong enough to oppose dictators. Why do these latter groups acquiesce to the dictator’s power grabs? This paper argues that strong elites face a collective action problem when resisting the dictator: if one group resists, then all members of the elite benefit because the dictator’s power remains constrained. This creates an incentive to free-ride. Weaker elites choose not to resist, hoping that stronger ones will. However, strong elites do not want to always be the ones paying the costs of checking the dictator’s ambitions. To discourage free riders, elites that could resist the dictator choose not to. This forces other regime members to pitch in and saves them effort over the long run. However, this also opens the door for the dictator’s power grabs. Leaders can capitalize on these opportunities to weaken power-sharing arrangements and make future assaults on elite power more likely to succeed. This paper presents a formal model of this strategic interaction and then tests its implications with a statistical analysis of a global sample of autocracies.

Author

• Jose Kaire, Arizona State University