Challenges of Elite Loyalty and Ethnic Stacking in al-Bashir Regime

• In Event: Elites Loyalty and the Survival of Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Recent scholarship on authoritarianism has underscored the significance of ethnic identity as a potent source of elite loyalty and cohesion. However, it often overlooks the dynamic nature of ethnic identity, which may not consistently yield unwavering loyalty to autocrats across diverse contexts. This article presents a theory of identity-based ethnic stacking in authoritarian regimes, where identities seem fluid and thus less effective in guaranteeing loyalty. I develop a theoretical framework of identity-based stacking in such challenging environments. I argue that regimes in these contexts use two strategies to achieve greater loyalty: concentric stacking and intersectional stacking, indicating that strategies of ethnic stacking are not static; they transform in response to shifting trust dynamics and elite defections. I develop this argument by analysing the case of Sudan during the regime of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019), drawing on interview data from my field work and numerous secondary sources.

Author

• Salam Alsaadi, University of Toronto