Temporal Dynamics of Power Consolidation in Dictatorships

• In Event: Elites Loyalty and the Survival of Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Why do some autocratic rulers quickly consolidate their power while others need a longer time? This article proposes a theory of power consolidation based on coalition formation and power shifts among leaders and elites. Previous formal models analyzing authoritarian elite power dynamics assume no exogenous shifts in leader-elite power balances. In reality, however, the political power of leaders and elites often unexpectedly changes over time due to various political and economic shocks. To address this issue, we develop a new agent-based model that explores the process of intra-elite coalition formation (and subsequent removal of leaders and elites) by allowing exogenous random shocks to their power distribution. Our findings demonstrate that the relationships between the initial power distribution and the long-term temporal pattern of power consolidation are much more complicated than the previous research implies. Counterintuitively, as the leader's power at the beginning of their tenure increases, the process of power consolidation becomes slower in some ranges of initial power distribution. This model contributes to understanding the complex dynamics of power consolidation and its variety.

Authors

• Jun Koga Sudduth, Indiana University, Bloomington

• Koji Oishi, Indiana University