Is One for All Good for All? How Consensus Norms Shape International Agreements

• In Event: IO Institutional Design

Abstract

Why do international agreements within the same issue area vary drastically in their enforcement? Literature on rational calculations would predict similar outcomes when the institution is designed to manage the same cooperation problem. Yet, institutions created to deal with the same issue of firearms trafficking show varied design outcomes of enforcement. To account for this puzzling divergence in treaty design, I argue that organizational specific norms during negotiations impact the outcome of institutional design. I draw from six months of fieldwork at the United Nations in Vienna, archival documents from the UN and the Organization of the American States, and interviews with relevant delegates. I implement cross-case comparisons, and process trace the negotiation history of the OAS convention regulating firearms trafficking, and the UN Firearms Protocol regulating illicit firearms trafficking. I find that negotiation norms shared between delegates shape the outcome of institutional design, allowing even weaker states to leverage such norms to their benefit. This research highlights the agency of individual diplomats and the impact of organizational pathology on international cooperation. It further shows that seeking international legitimacy through consensus could paradoxically diminish the strength of an international treaty, posing a dilemma between consensus and efficacy.

Author

• Bo Won Kim, University of Texas, Arlington