Building a New Stove: How Rising Powers Shape International Order

• In Event: Economic, Military, and Institutional Intervention in Great Power Competition

Abstract

How will a rising China shape international order? Analysts increasingly voice concern over China’s assertive behavior towards existing institutions, while others point with alarm at China’s creation of alternative institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is unsurprising that China seeks to leverage its growing strength to revise the existing order to its preferences. Yet how it does so—its strategy—remains understudied. Existing scholarship on power transitions and institutional change overly focus on compliance, overlooking strategies that take effect gradually and those that do not explicitly break the rules. Instead of asking whether rising powers play by the rules, this project asks what they do to the rules over time.

To this end, this project proposes four novel strategies of rule shaping, defined as a deliberate policy aimed at changing the effects of a rule, with each strategy characterized by a distinct shaping mechanism. I argue that rising powers prefer to first work with existing rules through these four strategies before considering creating alternatives, or ‘building a new stove.’ Its strategy choice is a function of three variables: the rule’s balance, its precision, and the cogency of the rising power’s desired change. In brief, a rule’s balance refers to whether a rising power can benefit from a rule more so than others can use the rule to hinder it. When the balance is favorable and others are not trying to change it, the rising power will support the rule. However, others may consider the rule outdated and disproportionately beneficial to the rising power, and seek to update it in an unfavorable direction. In response, the rising power pursues drift by obstructing such efforts, keeping outdated rules in place and enacting change through stagnation.

When the balance is unfavorable, the rising power evaluates the rule’s precision. The more precise a rule, the harder it is for a state to manipulate what is or is not within the scope of a rule. Conversely, an imprecise rule opens up room to maneuver that allows the rising power to circumvent costs associated with explicitly changing the rule. Faced with an unfavorable but imprecise rule, the rising power pursues cooptation, manipulating the rule’s scope—such as shifting its interpretation—to repurpose it towards more favorable ends.

The final variable is the rising power’s assessment of the cogency—or the persuasiveness—of its case for change. When cogency is high, the rising power reforms the rule in its desired direction, such as proposing amendments or new rules through existing procedures of change. Conversely, when cogency is low, directional change is unlikely, and the rising power pursues exceptionalism, unilaterally engaging in hypocrisy to mitigate the negative effects of the rule, risking hypocrisy costs to improve its position.

My theory also sets out the conditions under which the rising power ‘builds a new stove’ – when efforts at rule shaping have failed, the costs of supplying a competitive alternative are low, and the risk of incumbent pushback are temporarily lowered. In this paper, I test my theory against alternative explanations based on contested multilateralism, institutional change, and domestic politics, using both medium-n analysis and in-depth case studies. In particular, I will present results from recent archival research and elite interviews from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

In sum, this project provides a richer vocabulary to describes state behavior in international institutions, and in so doing advances debates in institutional change, power transition, and global governance. It also provides the tools to assess where US-China competition may be most intense, and to identify the appropriate tools of statecraft for managing such competition.

Author

• Raymond Wang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology