Elite Preferences for Conventional Burden-Sharing and Nuclear Proliferation

• In Event: Nuclear Weapons and Military Alliances

Abstract

What factors shape the arming preferences of American allies? The United States relies on assurances of protection to discourage U.S. allies from seeking nuclear weapons, yet many observers suggest that its assurances of support also reduce allies’ incentives to invest in defending themselves. Moreover, when presented with American requests to shoulder more responsibility for their own defense, some allies might prefer to do so by obtaining nuclear weapons. In this research note, I compare the role of several factors in shaping elite preferences over defense spending and nuclear weapons acquisition. Using qualitative evidence from interviews with foreign policy elites in Germany and Poland, and a survey of foreign policy elites from fifteen NATO members, the findings shed light on the comparative role of external threat perceptions, anti-militarist norms, and fear of abandonment by the United States, as well as the degree to which conventional and nuclear arming preferences are correlated.

Author

• Brian Blankenship, University of Miami