How Nuclear Allies Shape Conventional Armament Decisions

• In Event: Nuclear Weapons and Military Alliances

Abstract

An ally’s credible commitment of nuclear protection is supposed to reduce a state’s incentive to indigenously develop nuclear weapons. But how does that promise of nuclear protection influence the conventional military capabilities a state deploys? This paper investigates the role that extended nuclear deterrence plays in influencing the composition of a protege’s conventional military capabilities. I theorize that when a protege feels confident in the protection provided by its nuclear-armed ally, it will shift its conventional military capabilities towards those designed to deal with non-conventional threats and away from threats of conquest or invasion by a great power. Conversely, if confidence in the nuclear security guarantee wanes, the protege will be more inclined to seek the domestic acquisition of conventional military capabilities that provide a substitute for the survival-guarantee their ally’s nuclear weapons are supposed to provide. I empirically assess this argument in the context of US alliances in East Asia.

Author

• J Andres Gannon, Vanderbilt University