Great Power Competition Revisited

• In Event: Great Power Competition

Abstract

When and how great powers compete is a central question to International Relations. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to study the conditions under which great powers exercise influence in target countries through domestic “allies.” It explores situations in which two political groups within a third country compete for control of government policy, and great powers can potentially sway the policy outcomes by supporting groups whose policy preferences are most closely aligned with their own. The model with complete information suggests that great powers are more likely to intervene when their stakes are high in the target country, political polarization within the country is intense, and the allied faction is comparatively weaker. Under incomplete information, great powers may excessively support a faction to dissuade competition, or strategically limit their involvement to avoid escalation into a full-scale great power contest. This model implies that great powers choose to compete on a case-by-case basis and competition and conflict will not necessarily be a universal phenomenon. We illustrate the model through brief historical applications to the Soviet Union and the United States’ involvement in the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s and Cold War dynamics in Europe. The paper concludes with an application to the emerging competition between the United States and China.

Authors

• Yujia Wan, University of California, San Diego

• David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego