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Authoritarian leaders face a tradeoff of effectively balancing benefits between elites and masses to maximize the regime’s survival and stability prospects. This is especially salient when the leaders must undertake “hard redistribution” -- sustaining and improving the welfare state within the current political framework but without a substantial increase in fiscal commitments and social contributions. Facing the challenges of formidable structural changes such as rapid population aging and slower economic growth, the Chinese government has been leveraging regional disparity in social welfare provision to undertake cross-region redistribution instead of cross-class redistribution to meet public demands for better social protection. I demonstrate that the government’s distributive tactic dovetails with popular support for cross-region redistribution under the financial pressure in the fragmented and stratifying social insurance system. Drawing on original individual-level survey data in China between 2022 and 2023, I find that high financial risks in public pensions significantly increase respondents’ support for cross-region integration of social insurance. There is also evidence that these support peaks when the risk and inequality are cross-cutting. This study sheds light on why and how the Chinese regime can engage in “hard redistribution” without causing significant political and social instability driven by distributive conflicts.