Coercion, the Constitution, and the Search for Credibility

• In Event: Congress and Foreign Policy

Abstract

American politicians have for decades perceived a link between coercive credibility and the question of the constitutional war powers of Congress and the president. For example, the two largest blunders in American foreign policy since 1945—the Vietnam and Iraq Wars—were both preceded by votes in Congress in which many lawmakers argued voting in favor of war would make war less likely. Yet, despite the dire consequences of such formal authorization for the use of military force by Congress, precious little attention has been given by political scientists as to how the war powers and coercion actually interact.


This article first outlines the coercive logic of congressional authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) though a series of formal models. The key intuition shown is the effect is not purely informational, as prior models of domestic politics might suggest. Instead, formal authorization serves a functional role as an “incentives-rearranging” type mechanism, making intervention—and intervention at a higher scale—much more likely and thus credible. At the same time, the act of seeking authorization can, under certain circumstances, expose a president as a weak type and undermine threat credibility in the long run. While presidents benefit greatly from the political cover of formal authorization, they therefore resist appearing too eager for the backing of the legislature; presidents are careful to cultivate and maintain an image of an imperial presidency.

Author

• Michael Patrick Hulme, Stanford