Between Hammer and Anvil: Nationalism, Minority Accommodation, and Civil War

• In Event: Ethnic Inequality and Exclusion

Abstract

There is mounting evidence that the inclusion of ethnic minorities into government reduces the risks of civil war. However, under which circumstances are governing elites willing to share power in the first place? Existing studies highlight strategic constraints, yet face difficulties to account for nationalist resistance against limited concessions, even in the face of imminent civil violence. In this article we address this gap. We argue that majority nationalist movements, such as India's Hindutva movement, critically modify minority-government bargaining. First, their exclusionary ideology influences governing elites, limits the scope for power-sharing, and thereby fosters grievances among minorities. Second, irrespective of minorities' current political status, majority nationalists' public agitation generates fear over their future treatment. Through both mechanisms, majority nationalism increases the risk of civil war. Using new global data, we find that majority nationalist movements substantially increase the risks of exclusion and civil war onset through both mechanisms, especially if they control the government and make particularly extreme demands. Our results suggest the importance of expanding the conflict literature's focus on minority mobilization by considering nationalist counter-mobilization by majority groups.

Authors

• Andreas Juon, ETH Zurich

• Lars-Erik Cederman, ETH Zurich