The Logic of Institutionalized Defense Cooperation between Rival States

• In Event: Poster Session: Frontiers in Conflict Processes

Abstract

In less than three decades, bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) have become one of the fastest growing international regimes involving 140 countries in a dense network of more than 1000 active bilateral treaties. Unlike formal alliances, they do not involve any wartime military commitments. Instead, they help institute peacetime security governance by facilitating both resource and technology transfers, and policy coordination. This rise has been at a time when new formal alliances have been almost non-existent. What caused this dramatic shift away from a system of capability-aggregating arrangement to a worldwide expansion of a more decentralized overlapping network of peacetime defense cooperation? It is more intriguing is that many key rival dyads including India-China, China-Japan, Argentina-Chile, Brazil-Argentina and so on have formed one or more DCAs in the last two decades. What explains why rival states are engaging in this novel form of institutionalized military cooperation short of a formal alliance?

While there can be various political or security benefits, I focus on how DCAs can allow for improving bilateral relations between rival states. Many DCAs are signed by allies, as they serve as an auxiliary coordinating institution. I argue that many others are formed to build trust and confidence between hostile states, and to bridge their foreign policy preferences so that the prospect of further cooperation improves. States have a stronger incentive to institutionalize cooperation when they have a greater need for building trust and confidence. This logic applies particularly to rival states as they seek to increase collaboration in diverse areas despite failing to resolve their hostilities. By engaging in costly exchanges in critical defense areas, they can signal their rival counterparts more credibly their preference for collaboration. However, the intramural distributional effects can prevent rivals with a (near) strategic parity from engaging in DCAs. DCAs involve supporting partner states with military modernization, defense-industrial development, arms procurement, or military training to some extent. Any change in the relative defense capability is much more costly for rivals with a very low capability gap, as it can shift the bargaining leverage. However, it is less concerning for hostile dyads with asymmetric defense capabilities. DCAs can allow them to build partnerships, especially in international forums, without undermining their defense against the respective rival partners.

Using non-directed-dyadic panel data for 180 countries for the period of 1980-2010, I test two key hypotheses. First, strategic rivals with asymmetric defense capabilities are more likely to sign/maintain a defense cooperation agreement between them, compared to non-rival states (controlling for alliances) or rivals with more symmetric capabilities. And second, strategic rivals with asymmetric defense capabilities are more likely to experience an increased alignment in their foreign policy preferences when they have a defense cooperation agreement in place. Empirical evidence strongly supports both claims. The increased prospect of having DCAs is associated with a substantially steep decline in their UNGA voting difference. The mean predicted UNGA voting difference is more than 90 percent lower for a highly asymmetric rival dyad with a DCA, compared to a similar dyad with no DCA. The effect of a DCA is much smaller for non-rival dyads, having only less than 20 percent decline in their UNGA voting difference. The paper underscores the changing character and role of international security regimes in the contemporary world.

Author

• Md Muhibbur Rahman, Cornell University