Negotiating with Your Mouth Full: Transparency and Confidentiality in the EU

• In Event: I Would Do Anything for EU Governance (but I Won't Do That)

Abstract

Transparency lies at the heart of canonical theories of international negotiations and institutions—yet it is rarely directly measured or explained. This paper explores the potential unintended consequences of transparency in intergovernmental negotiations and institutions. We argue that as formal international meetings open up to the public, negotiators shift deliberations to more informal and opaque venues— particularly where issues are sensitive. To test when, how and why this occurs, we present new data on EU Council of Ministers negotiations between 1990 and 2019 and deploy both quantitative and qualitative analysis to explain when governments resort to negotiating during informal breaks where no minutes are taken. We conclude that the use of such informal breaks—especially at mealtimes—has increased substantially. Consistent with our theory, ministers often use these settings to address more controversial topics, that variations in the trend toward informality correlate with greater openness of formal meetings and are partly attributable to concerns over antagonistic political mobilization at home. These findings challenge received positive and normative theories about transparency in international institutions, and contributes to the literature on informal governance, negotiation studies, EU politics, and the transnational democratic deficit.

Author

• Mareike O. Kleine, London School of Economics